

THE  
CO-OPERATIVE MAGAZINE,  
AND  
*Monthly Herald.*

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Nº 6.—NEW SERIES.

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FOR JUNE, 1827.

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STREET, CORK; A. M. GRAHAM, COLLEGE GREEN, DUBLIN;  
AND J. MORTIMER, PHILADELPHIA.

SUBJECTS OF DISCUSSION AND LECTURE FOR THIS  
MONTH.

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JUNE 5th. Is the establishment of a Society in which right to equality of property shall prevail, practicable or desirable? (*Adjourned Question.*)

12th. Are argumentative discussions to be regarded as proper and effective means for elucidating the principles of this Society, and advancing the completion of its object? (*Adjourned Question.*)

19th. What are the circumstances which have hitherto retarded the progress of Co-operation in this country?

26th. Lecture on the different forms of Government which have been established among mankind.

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NOTICE.

"Of Praise and Blame, Rewards and Punishments, considered in their Relation to the Doctrine of the Necessity of our Actions, as asserted by Mr. Owen," will appear in our next Number.

THE  
CO-OPERATIVE MAGAZINE,  
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MONTHLY HERALD.

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No. VI.

JUNE, 1827.

Vol. II.

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NEW HARMONY.

AUTHENTIC accounts have been received from New Harmony, dated March 13th, from which it appears that community No. 1. has been dissolved for a time ; but that its most efficient members are about to form another community on the Ohio, about 50 miles above Cincinnati, with Dr. Price as its chief agent.

No. 3, or the Education community, is proceeding with every success which could be hoped for.

A party of Backwoods-men are forming another community on the Harmony lands. A community, composed of very steady individuals, also lately formed on the New Harmony lands, is proceeding with the best spirit and greatest unanimity, under the direction of another Price, (no relative of the Doctor's,) who only fifteen years ago erected a fort on the same spot, as a protection against the Indians.

Beside these, 15 German families, who bear the character of clever workmen and good citizens, appear to be on their march for New Harmony.

About 12 or 14 young men have also associated, apparently for the purpose of trying something of a superior cast, as they are extremely select in their admission of candidates, and they have many applications.

It thus appears, that although Mr. Owen has resigned the manage-

ment, yet the Community system is not given up, but on the contrary is on the increase. The existing communities are in a more healthy state than ever. The separations which have taken place, instead of being evidence of the difficulty of uniting large numbers, will, there is every reason to conclude, ultimately tend to furnish a model for conducting even a large community with perfect success.

Mr. Owen and his two sons were still at Harmony at the date of this information, March 13.

(From the *Baltimore Patriot*.)

There has recently appeared several paragraphs containing rumours of the dissolution and dispersion of Mr. Owen's establishment at New Harmony. The *New Harmony Gazette* of the 28th of March, gives a concise history of the establishment from its commencement to the present time; from which we learn, that it was found "That the whole population, numerous as they were, were too various in their feelings and too dissimilar in their habits to unite and govern themselves harmoniously as one community." They accordingly separated into three communities, independent of each other and of Mr. Owen. These, however, were indiscreet in their admission of members, and two of them abandoned their independence, and requested Mr. Owen and four trustees to take the superintendence of their affairs. This latter attempt to unite in a community of common property and equal rights was also frustrated by the development of the fact, that the establishment did not pay its own expenses. The reasons given for the deficiency of income, one would have thought, would have occurred to the mind of a man of Mr. Owen's apparent knowledge of human nature, without the aid of an experiment. "The deficiency," says the *Gazette*, "appeared immediately attributable in part to carelessness in many members as regarded community property; in part to their want of interest in the experiment itself; and these again were to be traced to a want of confidence in each other, which was increased by the unequal industry and by the discordant variety of habits that existed among them." In such a state of things it is not surprising that "the natural consequences ensued." Next, a voluntary association was formed out of the population of New Harmony who "had mutual confidence in one another's intentions, and mutual pleasure in one another's society." This latter community, as well as the one that did not abandon its independence, located themselves on the Harmony lands out of town. With regard to those who remained in town, the only effectual remedy appeared to be in circumscribing each person's interest and responsibility. The community was therefore subdivided into occupations, each one of which became responsible for its own operations alone, and remained independent of the others.

"This" (says the *Gazette*) "is the present situation of New Harmony. Each occupation supports itself, paying weekly a small per centage towards the general expenses of the town; each regulating its own affairs, determining its own internal regulations, and distributing or exchanging its own produce. New Harmony, therefore, is not a community; but, as was originally intended, a central village, out of, and around which, communities have formed, and many continue to form themselves, and with the inhabitants of which these communities may exchange their products; thus obtaining those manufactured articles, which the limited operations incidental to an incipient colony do not enable them to produce themselves."

—The *Gazette* concludes by briefly stating that the advance of the three or four communities which have settled on the lands around New Harmony is progressive and secure.—From this history of New Harmony we are induced to believe that the Great Reformer of Society has got himself into "a peck of troubles."

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We do not at all fear that the Great Reformer of Society is in any *peck of troubles*, or at least in any which he will not speedily get out of. He experienced more difficulties at New Lanark, before he brought his establishment there to success or prosperity, than he has now to encounter. Lycurgus did not effect his reformation of society at Sparta without meeting with difficulties and having to exercise care and patience. Though the community, No. 1, has been broken up, its most efficient members, it appears, are more confident of the practicability and excellence of the system than ever, and accordingly are proceeding to form a new communional establishment. The same was the case with the members of the community near Exeter, who were obliged to break up that community through want of means, and some of whom are now establishing another. All those also, whom we have seen that have been obliged to leave Orbiston, have expressed to us their fullest confidence in the system, and their wish to become members of a community near London, as soon as possible.

We know likewise from some information which we have lately received, that the principles are making way on the continent of Europe, and are likely soon to make a rapid progress. In Ireland the Dublin Co-operative Society is proceeding with alacrity, and is about the immediate formation of a community.

In spite therefore of the gloomy prognostications and chuckling attempts at ridicule of the enemies of our System, our hopes of the advance of the principles, and their being carried into action, are stronger, and our spirits higher than ever.—Ed.

## ORBISTON.

*To J. M. Morgan, Esq., Belle Sauvage Yard, London.*

DEAR SIR,

Orbiston, April 14, 1827.

CONSCIOUS of your anxiety for the success of the co-operative system, and of this community in particular, I feel convinced that no apology is necessary for sending you my opinion of the present state of affairs at Orbiston. I arrived here on the 2nd, after a most tedious passage, and with pleasure inform you, that the general appearance of things has improved greatly during my absence; the grounds are greatly improved, especially the garden in front of the building, which we are now laying out and interspersing with pleasure-walks and rows of apple- and pear-trees, of which we have planted near a thousand this year; the roads and walks are also greatly improved, and we are erecting neat gates at the entrances, which, with the shrubberies and flower borders now planting round the building gives the whole an air of neatness and regularity exceeding any thing we could reasonably expect in so short a time. Our wheat, of which we have about forty acres, looks strong and healthy, and we are now sowing oats and other grain; nearly the whole of the members are now working on the land, and will continue to do so till all the seed is in, when they will return to their various occupations till harvest, when our whole strength will again be mustered in the fields. A great improvement is also visible in the interior of the building; the public rooms are kept in better order, the passages and stairs are regularly cleaned and lighted; and the public mess, if it does not give general satisfaction, is at least considerably better managed than I have known it heretofore; while cleanliness and comfort is rapidly increasing, the members themselves must naturally become happier. That such was really the case I was convinced on my arrival; for the invariable answer to my inquiries was, that they were more comfortable, and things were looking better than they had done for a considerable time. But nothing can be more pleasing to the friends of the new system, than the improvement which has taken place in the manners and general behaviour of the co-operators themselves. A gentleman from Hamilton, who is in the habit of visiting our community, with whom I was conversing a few days since, expressed his surprise at the great alteration which had taken place, not only in the cleanliness of the building, but also in the general demeanour and

apparent happiness of its inmates in the last two months. Our theatre, which was commenced previous to my leaving Orbiston, is now finished; it is particularly neat, and will hold about three hundred individuals; it is enriched with several scenes painted by Miss Whitwell, who is now painting a drop scene, which is intended to give a correct view of Orbiston as it will appear when finished. The visitors from the surrounding country (whom we admit gratis) on the evenings selected for dramatic performances, are numerous and respectable; and nothing can be a more convincing proof of the happiness of our members, than the very spirited manner in which (after the labours of the day are over) they sustain their various characters. We have also a new and commodious store opened on the ground-floor, for supplying ourselves and the surrounding country with all kinds of provision and manufactured goods. Mr. Hamilton has been here this week, and is, I believe, well pleased with the progress we have made during his absence. It is with sorrow I add, that our much-valued friend Mr. A. Combe is still very ill, and I fear it will be long ere we shall again have the benefit of his personal assistance. The affairs of the community are now conducted by Mr. W. Combe, whose management appears to give general satisfaction. You will perceive by the foregoing sketch of Orbiston, that I have found it considerably improved during my short absence from it; and though it is probable we still may have considerable difficulties to overcome, I flatter myself our ultimate success is almost beyond a doubt.—With confident hopes of the success of the co-operative system in general, and a sincere determination to do my utmost in the advancement of so laudable a cause,

I remain, Sir,

Your very obedient Servant,

W. S. ROGERS.

(From the *Nottingham and Newark Mercury* of May 12, 1827.)

WE have observed in several of the provincial papers a statement that Mr. Owen has been compelled to abandon New Harmony through despair of bringing his plan to any effect. We have been at some pains to ascertain the accuracy of this statement; and though we are certainly not prepared to deny the thing altogether, yet we are enabled to look upon it with a strong feeling of mistrust. The System is not without its enemies, paradoxical as it may seem, that

any experiment which is made for the amelioration of mankind, should excite enmity in the human breast ; but such is the fact, and though in a great measure done under the mask of ridicule, yet the fang of the serpent soon betrays its deadly malignity. One half of the miseries the world is labouring under, arise from conceit and pride, generated by inordinate self-love ; and the man who truly has the good of his fellow-creatures at heart, is treated as a wild and visionary speculator. Our present business, however, is with the New Establishment at Orbiston, yet in its infancy ; though daily gaining strength from proper nourishment, and to which many thousands in England and America are earnestly and anxiously looking for success or failure. For ourselves, the chief wish is to see our brethren raised from galling degradation and pauperism to enjoy the fruits of their industrious toil, well convinced that the Being who created us, never gave existence to any one with a design of making it a curse and a burthen. We have been favoured with a copy of a private letter from Orbiston, dated the 20th ult. which we present to our readers. It is addressed to a gentleman whose humane principles render him an attentive and anxious observer of their proceedings.

DEAR SIR,

Orbiston, 20th April, 1827.

I have this evening received your very interesting letter, and I can with pleasure inform you that this grand experiment has already been attended with the most striking results ; so much so, that I firmly believe that there is scarcely a single individual on whom it has not wrought some improvement, either in morals or manners, and generally in both. I must confess, prepared as I considered myself for the change, it has had a visible effect on my manners, temper and habits : from this you may judge of the effect it must have had upon a promiscuous multitude, who, for the most part, have fled hither as to a city of refuge, without any idea of the principles upon which they would be compelled by circumstances to act. If it were possible to divest ourselves of the feeling that it is one of ourselves on whom the experiment is working its way, it would be really amusing to observe the effect which our plans have upon every fresh comer,—to see how anxiously all of them desire to unite the fancied advantages of the old system acquired by artificial means, with the real ones of the new obtained by natural means, and the reluctance with which they give up the hopeless attempt. The individuals associated here are, most of them, now tolerably well aware of the superiority of their present state to that of their brethren around them, and show by their conduct that they would submit to almost any difficulties rather than return to old society. Many have left, in con-

sequence of the change from their previously acquired idle habits to those of industry being too trying for them; but, as far as we can learn, they have had reason to repent it: we have had applications from several lately to return, but they have been refused.

Many of the females remark, that they never knew their husbands so comfortable and so free from inquietude before. We have several amongst us who were confirmed drunkards previous to their coming here, but the general opinion being against them is found to be a powerful check; the practice of posting their names, as in the infirmary, and a slight mention in the register of flagrant vice, is generally feared. It is but seldom that we are now infested with the hateful vice of drunkenness, although whiskey is so cheap here. Confidence in our success is visibly on the increase: this is evidenced by the fact that almost all of us are now actively engaged on the land: three months ago it was generally thought that the land would not support us, although it is a very superior soil and most delightfully situated; the consequence of which was, that we still kept up a hankering desire for manufactures, to furnish markets already glutted; and while this was the case, vexations and disappointments prevailed, which had the effect of convincing us of the fragility of the reed on which we trusted, and compelled us to turn our attention to spade cultivation. This has been attended with the most happy effects, and appears to have done more to unite our minds than any other measure, which is clearly shown by the increased good feeling which appears generally to abound. There is nothing that can appear to an Englishman more disgusting than the general filth which pervades Scotland. This was a great source of wretchedness to us at first, but I am happy to say that the nuisance has been greatly removed: the building now wears a very cleanly appearance, and the children are now kept very clean and look very healthy. Many of the rooms, which we could scarcely enter at first, are now decent: example has done much in this respect, in some instances to a very remarkable extent. I am very sorry to say that the schools are, at present, in a most imperfect state. And it is with pleasure I turn from these to the elder boys: there are about twenty of them, who are engaged regularly eight hours per day, in the fields, trenching the grounds; it is really astonishing with what ardent industry they follow up this most laborious work. They do, on an average, from an acre and a half to two acres a week, with their two directors: and it is calculated that the effects of this mode of culture will be seen for seven years; that is to say, one trenching quite renewing the soil, it will take that time to wear it out with ordinary crops. It is seriously thought, by the most intelligent amongst us, that we shall become rich before we are aware of it: with our fine estate, of which we have a perpetual lease at about 50s. per acre, we must be more than idle if we do not. We have now several

acres brought into garden culture, and beautifully planted with fruit-trees, which we calculate will pay the whole rent in less than seven years.

I think it may be said that Orbiston has already fully proved the truth of Mr. Owen's plan, and completely answered the expectation of the principal proprietors: still it is but the beginning of co-operation, and consequently very imperfect; and although I would prefer living here to any place without the system, yet I think that the system might be brought about in any part of England, with much greater ease (local advantages excepted) than it has been here, and might also be carried into effect at much less cost with much more comfort. From what I have seen here, I feel confident that ten families, with 150*l.* each, might carry the thing into effect any where. The proprietors here have had much to grapple with, as well from the ignorance of the tenants as the opposition of pretended friends; but, by the energy of Messrs. Hamilton and Combe, many obstructions have been overcome, and we are now going on very comfortably. Mr. Owen is expected to arrive in this country in June. I should be very glad to see you here, you may come very economically, and I am sure you would be highly delighted.

I am your's respectfully,

J. L.

#### DUBLIN CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY.

WE are most happy to be able to state that there is a Co-operative Society formed in Dublin, and proceeding with much spirit. It has some thousands of pounds subscribed already for the formation of a community; and it has just made a proposal for a Nobleman's mansion and demesne for the purpose. This nobleman offers to send his son, and procure the sons of seven other noblemen to be sent to the intended school of the establishment.

#### DUBLIN CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY,

FORMED, A. D. 1827,

For collecting and disseminating information concerning the Co-operative System:

1—By forming fixed and circulating libraries of books and pamphlets, relating to this and other branches of Political Economy, and the arts and sciences.

2—By meetings for conversation, and for the discussion of questions illustrative of the system.

3—By aiding in the establishment of Co-operative communities throughout the country.

#### RULES.

I—The Society shall consist of Members and Associates.

II—The Members shall consist of those persons who originated the Society, and of such others as they, by unanimous choice, may add to their number from among the Associates.

III—The Associates shall in like manner be chosen by the Members.

IV—The name, residence, occupation and character of every person proposed as an Associate shall be stated by the Member proposing him; and every Member then present is expected to give all the information in his power concerning the individual proposed.

V—The Associates have the right to borrow books, to attend conversations, and to introduce Visitors to the conversations.

VI—Every Member or Associate, on introducing a Visitor, shall insert such Visitor's name, together with his own, in a book prepared for the purpose.

VII—No meeting of any kind shall be competent to transact business unless five members be present.

VIII—The Society shall meet once a week for conversations on subjects illustrative of the system.

IX—The meetings shall commence at half-past seven, and terminate at half-past ten in the evening of

X—Every Member and Associate shall contribute a sum not less than ten shillings yearly towards defraying the expenses of the Society.

XI—The management of the affairs of the Society shall be vested in the Members for the time being.

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#### ANSWER TO C. F. C.'s REJOINDER ON "THE IMPRACTICABILITY OF THE CO-OPERATIVE SYSTEM."—(No. II. p. 87. New Series.)

WE are sorry our friend,—for we hope, notwithstanding his altered tone, he will still allow us to call him so, and to consider him still towards us what we certainly are towards him,—we are sorry he should feel "the contest" into which, he says, "a few cursory remarks have drawn him, a *fearful* one."

He says, that "the system we advocate has been, and ever will be, the *offspring of philanthropy*." This is allowing it, if practicable, the

very highest praise ; giving it the very first recommendation. Should we then abandon the support of truth in its cause ? Should we desert the system, which he himself acknowledges to be that of "*philanthropy*," and shrink,—he probably, if we did so, would conceive,—confounded, dismayed, struck motionless at the appearance of his assertions against it ? We did not consider them such dreadful battering-rams, such irresistible enginery, as would justify us in leaving our citadel to be at once sacked by their very approach. The sound of his trumpet we did not think "a blast so drear and shrill" as at once to shake our system, Jericho-like, to demolition. Indeed, we could not perceive that on any one of our positions it had made an impression, or displaced even a stone or a scantling. But in showing that we could not, we certainly did not intend either to wound or to mortify, to abuse or to ridicule ; to be coarse or cutting ;—we did not seek to show our wit more than our candour ; we knew no wounded pride ; we felt no ill-concealed chagrin ; we did not attempt to be sarcastic, scoffing, or contemptuous,—more than reasoning, searching for truth, and conciliating. If we could not now and then but smile, it was not the smile of ill-nature ; we did not affect the derider or the scorner.

Why then should our friend say he has been *drawn into* a contest, and "a *fearful* contest" too ? Was it not he himself threw down the gauntlet ?—and the gauntlet we took up, not for "contest," but discussion. Nor did we intend to make the discussion "*fearful*" to him : neither can we conceive why he should think it in the least so. Indeed, if we looked on it as "*fearful*" to us, our fear would not be without some excuse. Even if our system were but a vision, yet would it, by our friend's own acknowledgement, be a bright vision, a dream-built citadel of splendour, an illusionary structure of crowding glories. That this could be dissolved, even by the powers of truth,—that we could be hurled from the rapt bliss of such a dazzling though imaginary mansion, to the "sad realities" of our present pandemonium, and to the melancholy conviction that our ideal theatre of effulgence could never be more than a "baseless fabric," it would appear not altogether inexcusable in us to contemplate with some degree of melancholy and apprehension. We sometimes feel a keen regret at being awoke from slumber's scenes of transport. Sometimes,

"To dream once more we close our willing eyes,  
And call the dear deceits again to rise:"

nor is the call altogether without apology. But that the elucidation of mistake, the untwining of prejudice, the unravelling of error, the illustration of truth by fact, experience, and deduction, in support of what promises to raise mankind from distress to comfort, from ignorance to knowledge, from contention, jealousy and strife, to peace, benignity and concord ; from viciousness, vicissitude and misery, to virtue, security and happiness,—that this should be regarded by any one as “*fearful*,” appears at first sight unaccountable, and would seem incredible, were it not actually a fact. And yet,—alas, “*poor human nature !*” but, *poor factitious* human nature !—it is as actually a fact, as it is apparently unaccountable, or, but for its being a fact, would be seemingly incredible.

Our friend says, “he shrinks from the contest almost as from a useless task :” and yet he briskly renews it, though indeed with something like “the last sad effort of despair ;” or, it would rather seem, more with a wish to wound than hope to conquer. Of the renewal however we are glad, as well as we were of the commencement ; for we hope it will not be entirely “useless,” though perhaps not according to his seeming wish : and though perhaps, also, it would be as judicious in him to have preserved the same tone of temper, humanity, and candour with which he began, yet we must do our friend the justice to allow, that though a little “wincing” may show a little “galling” on his part, he is “no jade,” for he mends on the trot as he goes on.

He says, “the sanguine and theoretical are seldom convinced by anything short of disappointment.” The proverb also says, “There are none so blind as those who will not see ;” and the doggrel says,

“Convince a man against his will,  
He’s of the same opinion still.”

Did our friend never see a person who could not be persuaded by any reasoning to allow that it would be better for him to procure himself some comforts with part of his uselessly-heaped hoards, than to stint himself in the most absolute necessities of life to add to those hoards ? Did our friend never read that Copernicus and Galileo were counted not only “sanguine and theoretical,” but absurd and impious, for affirming that the earth moved ? that Columbus was reckoned visionary and wild, for maintaining that a vast land was still to be discovered ? that even by his own learned brotherhood Harvey was ridiculed and reviled, for asserting the circulation of the blood ? We do not consider

it very astonishing that numbers of the unreflecting should think it "sanguine and theoretical," to expect that the circulation of knowledge, the discovery of a vast space of improvement in art and science, the movement of intellect and march of mind, should produce a progressive advance of that, for which only they are valuable,—of happiness, and consequently of what to happiness are most essential, of peace, good-will, and wise arrangements; of harmony, mutual assistance, and united interests: but that our friend should, if he really does think so, we do indeed consider most astonishing. Would the ignorant and powerless, the uncultivated, unclad, and unsheltered savage believe, that he or his offspring ever would become the raiser of palaces and pyramids; the creator of fortresses and cities; the framer of the loom, and the fabricator of the web; the constructor of the machine and the contriver of the laboratory; the transformer of matter and the controller of every element to his use; the employer of the winds and the arrester of the lightning; the measurer of the heavens, and the rider of the water and the atmosphere; that he would become a Cheops, a Belus, a Ctesiphon, a Vitruvius, an Archytas, an Archimedes, a Newton, a Franklin, a Cook, a Montgolfier, a Watt, an Arkwright, a Davy? And yet our friend has seen all this, and much more, though his rude forefather did not conceive the thousandth part of it possible. And can he still insist that we cannot direct to our own happiness those things, namely, our own customs, habits and intercourse with each other, which seem so much more within our control than the rocks, the mines, the winds, the waters, and those other external matters which we have subjugated to our use?

We indeed should deem ourselves deficient in modesty, were we to scoff at and set at nought the united opinions of even such men as Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and Plutarch, as More and Montesquieu, Bacon, Butler, Stewart, and many others of such antiques and modern antiques. Our friend doubtless would be of the same opinion with regard to us. But with respect to himself;—why, notwithstanding his peculiar diffidence, should he hesitate one moment to despise such beings as those mentioned, though allowed certainly to be some degrees above idiots; why hesitate to laugh them and their opinions to scorn? While, however, we hold them in the respect in which, silly enough doubtless, we do, he will we hope forgive, though he may flout us, for now and then pondering on some of their notions, and thinking them not entirely absurd. We imagine we can perceive

something apposite to the present occasion in an observation of the last-named author's in his *Elements of the Philosophy of the Mind*. This author, Dugald Stewart, says, "One thing is certain, that the greatest of all obstacles to the improvement of the world is that prevailing belief of its improbability, which damps the exertions of so many individuals; and that in proportion as the contrary opinion becomes general, it realizes the event which it leads us to anticipate."

We trust that this reflection, from even such a poor authority as Dugald Stewart, we may without absolute impudence to our friend put, with whatever fear and trembling we should do so, near our friend's last-quoted observation, that "the sanguine and theoretical are seldom convinced by anything short of disappointment."

Nay, we would hope, that without insolence to our friend we may quote Stewart a little further. "Surely," continues Stewart, "if anything can have a tendency to call forth in the public service the exertions of individuals, it must be an idea of the magnitude of that work in which they are conspiring, and a belief of the permanency of those benefits which they confer on mankind by every attempt to inform and enlighten them. As in ancient Rome, therefore, it was regarded as the mark of a good citizen, never to despair of the republic: so the good citizen of the world, whatever may be the political aspect of his own times, will never despair of the fortunes of the human race; but will act on the conviction, that prejudice, slavery, and corruption must gradually give way to truth, liberty, and virtue: and that in the *moral* world, as well as in the *material*, the further our observations extend and the longer they are continued, the more we shall conceive of order and of benevolent design in the universe."

In another place Stewart says, "Of the progress which may yet be made in the different branches of moral and philosophical philosophy, we may form some idea from what has already happened in physics, since the time that Lord Bacon first united in one useful direction the labours of those who cultivate that science. At the period when he wrote, physics was certainly in a more hopeless state than moral and philosophical philosophy is in the present age. A perpetual succession of chimerical theories had till then amused the world; and the prevailing opinion was, that the case would continue the same for ever. *Why, then, should we despair of the competency of the human faculties to establish solid and permanent systems upon other subjects, which are of still more serious importance.*"

"The subjects of more serious importance," which Stewart alludes to here, are our social arrangements, our customs, habits, and intercourse with each other to produce "our being's end and aim,"—happiness. If he does not speak with as much confidence, with as much oracular authority, as our friend does, when pronouncing that "our system will never lead to any but solitary and imperfect results," and answering his own question, whether "we shall realize our promises," with the plumper, the extinguisher of hope, "Never;" his views are at least more consolatory. And, notwithstanding our friend's profound views of human nature, and his determined prescience, we prefer abiding in the sun-light of hope with such "sanguine and theoretical" visionaries as Stewart, Bacon, and such wild theorists, to betaking ourselves to the shades of despair, even with our friend, however untheoretical, and resting on the grounds of "sober sadness." Bacon was certainly one of the most "theoretical" of men; for he contemplated the future existence of almost a world of changes and discoveries, of which he could suggest only the distant openings of the path to the accomplishment; yet he is held in some estimation for wisdom. Penn was only a "sanguine and theoretical" individual, when he was, as Montesquieu observes, "forming a people, to whom probity seems as natural as bravery to the Spartans." The Jesuits were only "sanguine and theoretical," when they were contemplating their settlements at Paraguay. Mohammed was only so, when he was speculating on founding a new religion and a new empire. Lycurgus was only so, when he was meditating the establishment of a new system, new customs, habits, and even modes of thinking, so contrary to the former ones at Sparta. What else can be said of Wesley, Fox, Luther, Calvin, and other founders of sects? what else of all the successful promoters of philosophy, the arts, and sciences? Hence, then, our friend perhaps may allow, or at least perceive, that "the sanguine and theoretical" are often convinced by "*something short of disappointment*," if he thinks success is short of it. If our friend prefers the never-ending dismal, if he is not satisfied with having

"Hope for a season bid the world farewell," but must have that bright divinity wing her eternal flight from us, and abandon unfortunate mankind to an everlasting round of error, crime, and misery,—we must, with all our respect for him, confess that we do not envy him his taste.

Notwithstanding our friend's truly "desperate fidelity" to his colours, however, we are tempted to make another quotation to our purpose. Even Bacon, the "theoretical," we can hardly give up entirely still. "It may," says he, "be likewise an argument of further *hope*, that some of the things already discovered are such as before their discovery did not enter into men's minds even to suspect: so that any man would have despised them as *impossibilities*. For it is an usual way with mankind to form conjectures of new things according to the examples of old ones, and according to the opinions thence preconceived and entertained, which is a very fallacious manner of judging; for many particulars derived from the fountains or origin of things do not flow in the common channels."

But Bacon was "a sanguine" man in the cause of hope: our friend, determining probably to be wiser by not putting it in the power of fortune herself to disappoint him, at least for the worse, is sanguine only in the cause of despair. Cased at every point in the panoply of this his desirable Minerva, he takes the field against the Co-operative System, and makes his first onset by a furious attack on the oft-devoted Spartans. Here he certainly deserves the praise of acting up to his character. He, it seems, is resolved to be anti-co-operative in deed as well as in argument, or perhaps we should say, in assertion; for he certainly, it seems to us, asserts more than argues: and in his assertions, in the true spirit and act of anti-co-operation, he goes against every good authority, but *himself*, that has ever treated about Sparta. Every other admires and praises; he loathes and reprobates her. But she is a dead lion; and the dead lion may (the allusion of course goes no further) be kicked with safety. We cannot say to him, "Go and see the living proof." All we can say is, "Go and consult the writings of all her cotemporaries who mention her, from Herodotus to Plutarch; go also and consult the most profound authorities, whether on laws, politics, or history, who mention her, from Plutarch down to Montesquieu, and the latest and most accurate noted English historian of Greece, Mitford,—and see in them what she was." But his mind seems to be made up against her; and because she had not every thing, she had nothing; because she had not every virtue, she had no virtue; because she was deficient in some things, she was deficient in all things. Our friend is a true apostolical judge against her; because she "offended in *one point*, she was guilty of all."

And our friend's candour to us seems on a par with his lenity to her. We do not altogether complain of his saying, that "we linked the name of Sparta with an institution designed for the welfare of mankind." But when he states that "we pointed to her as a model," we cannot help saying that either his candour or his memory slept, and that misrepresentation, unintentional we would wish to believe, usurped the place of accuracy. Indeed, that his memory could sleep on this occasion, we should think rather extraordinary, if we did not reflect that "*aliquando dormitat bonus Homerus*;" and why should not he as well as Homer have a nod, especially when it is so convenient for his object! Certainly if it was his memory winked here, he must have been very drowsy: for he himself stated in his former letter, that "we ourselves admitted that in the past or the present we found *no* model;" and in answer to this we said, "we admit that we have found *no* one perfect model." About Sparta also, in answer to his assertion that "the Helot pined in her;" we said, "We did and do allow this. We allow also that the harshness of her discipline and customs was excessive; that it turned her attention too much to war; that it diverted her too much from science, and the arts and embellishments of life."

How, after such admissions, and the admission of "all the severities and repulsive features connected with her system," we could with justice be said to "point to Sparta as a model," we can scarcely imagine. We have more than once given our opinion of Sparta as far from having been a model. We allowed that she was unjust not only towards the Helots, but in some measure towards the Spartans themselves, on whom she or her discipline imposed unnecessary austerities and sufferings, and whom she deprived of many innocent nay salutary sources of pleasure and delight, as well as materially injured by her very injustice to the Helots. We brought her forward only as an instance how far even a system of confined community of property and communion of interests could carry its members. But we said at the same time, that in not extending this to the Helots she was more than unfit to be a model; her conduct was to be condemned and avoided. If however we were just against her, fairness required that we should be just for her; that if we "nothing extenuated, we should set down nought in malice" about her; that if we showed wherein she was deficient, we should also show wherein she excelled; that if we allowed the true charges against her, we should refute the false.

But our friend, not content with having once discharged his poisoned, or at least as it appears to us poisoned, arrows against her, returns to the charge with an enlarged quiver. Let us see the ingredients of the infusion in which they are dipped.

He says "Sparta, you" (meaning us) "venture to say, flourished longer than any other state, in *peace, happiness, virtue; without revolution, without bloodshed.* In peace!" he continues,—“From a war of aggression of thirty-nine years, from the Messenian conflict to the destruction of Athens, from their defeat by Epaminondas to their extinction,—were not the Spartans the actors of a scene of bloodshed and oppression, whether on their own account or when hired by Persian monarchs?”

Now we think we have read that there were two wars, in what he makes the one of thirty-nine years. The first Messenian war is said to have been occasioned by the abuse of a Lacedæmonian virgin by the Messenians. Who then was the aggressor in this war? This continued for about twenty years, and the Messenians were conquered. The second Messenian war was begun by the Messenians, who refused to abide any longer by the terms of peace, which they had before agreed to. Who then were the aggressors in this also? This continued near eighteen years, when the Messenians, again conquered, emigrated into Sicily. We do not pretend to justify every act of the Spartans during those wars. They might have required too much from the Messenians in reparation for the injury to the female. They also imposed too hard terms on the Messenians when conquered; and therefore the latter were probably justified in rebelling. But the Messenians were the aggressors in both instances. From Lycurgus's establishment of his laws at Sparta, also, to the first Messenian war, was upwards of a hundred and thirty years; and there are few other states can show so long a duration of peace and internal tranquillity. From the end of the second Messenian war to Xerxes' invasion of Greece, which as well as we recollect was the next war which the Spartans were engaged in, was a space of upwards of two hundred and twenty years: and if our friend will tell us of "any other state or city which flourished so long in peace, happiness and virtue; without revolution, without tumult, with unchanged laws, with unaltered customs,"—he will assist our memory. We also do not recollect that from Lycurgus's period to the Peloponnesian war,—a space of upwards of four hundred years, during which Lycur-

gus's institutions were observed at Sparta in their full purity,—they ever suffered themselves to be hired by the Persian monarch : but indeed we think we do recollect that they indignantly refused to be so.

Our friend then asks, "What was the Spartan's happiness?" Plutarch, who perhaps knew nearly as much of it as our friend, will tell him. Montesquieu—and he seems to have read and reflected not a little on such subjects—will tell him. "The Spartan's happiness" was, according to those authorities, not gormandizing to surfeit, and drinking to madness ; not amassing useless hoards of wealth, and accumulating oppressive loads of consequent cares and anxieties ; but simple fare, invigorating exercise, the enjoyment of music and poetry, sensible conversation, giving to youth a virtuous example and education, doing what he chose, (for he chose to do what the law directed,) content ; and, to use Montesquieu's words, that "love of equality, which limits ambition to the sole desire, the sole happiness of doing greater services to our country than the rest of our fellow-citizens." "The love of their country," says the historian, "was their ruling passion, and all self-interest seemed lost in the general wish for the welfare of the public. Pædaretus having missed the honour of being chosen one of the three hundred who had a certain rank in the city, converted his disappointment into a source of joy, "that there were three hundred more worthy men in Sparta than he."

Our friend, doubtless imagining that he is better qualified to judge than either Lycurgus or Montesquieu, answers his own question, "what was the Spartan's happiness?" thus : "The hour of combat,—the tiger's savage joy." If naturalists are to be believed, the tiger's savage joy is not "the hour of combat," but the hour of mangling and devouring. But was this the case with the Spartan? What does the historian answer? "When the Spartans," he says, "had broken and routed their enemies, they never pursued them further than was necessary to insure their victory." Nor, if we be allowed to put the opinion of their cotemporaries in competition with our friend's, was "the hour of combat the Spartan's happiness" or object. "It was not," says Plutarch, "the principal design of Lycurgus, that his city should govern many others ; but he considered *its happiness*, like that of a private man, flowing from virtue and self-consistency : he therefore so ordered and disposed it, that by the freedom and sobriety of its inhabitants, and having a sufficiency within themselves, its continuance might be the more secure. Plato, Diogenes, Zeno, and other writers on

government, have taken Lycurgus for their model; and these, though they have left only an idea of something excellent, have attained great praise. Yet he who not in idea and words, but in fact produced a most inimitable form of government, and by showing a whole city of philosophers, confounded those who imagine that the so much boasted strictness of a philosophic life is impracticable;—he, I say, stands in the rank of glory far above the founders of all the other Grecian states." Aristotle says, "that though the Spartans almost deified Lycurgus, they did not honour him enough." Now if all those great authorities, who were cotemporaries with the Spartans, and with their own eyes observed them, did not see them wiser, more virtuous and happier, than other people,—surely they, and especially Aristotle, who was not too much given to the profusion of praise, would not think and speak so enthusiastically of Lycurgus, the moulder of the Spartan character. Our friend may think his retrospective view as infallible as his prospective; but we cannot help feeling in Aristotle's, Xenophon's, Aristides', and Plutarch's view of Sparta,—as in Bacon's, More's, Montesquieu's, Condorcet's, and Stewart's view of what man may hereafter be,—somewhat more confidence than in his.

We had almost forgot noticing our friend's allusion to the Spartans' "*destruction of Athens*:"—it was only the conquest, not the destruction; for "the Spartans," says the historian, "preferring the glory and safety of Greece in general to their own private resentment, would not destroy a city which had stood first in fame among the Grecian states:"—and we also omitted observing on the allusion to "their defeat by Epaminondas." Athens is allowed on all hands to have been the aggressor in her quarrel with Sparta. "It was she," observes Montesquieu, "first taught Sparta ambition," by aspiring at superiority and dominion, and therefore it was she who brought on herself subjugation. But instead of Sparta's having been a continual "actor of bloodshed and oppression," as our friend insinuates, she was, according to all authentic accounts, chosen, on account of her equity and love of peace, the common umpire and peacemaker of Greece, from the æra of Lycurgus down to the arrogant assumption of power by Athens, with the exception of the time of the Messenian wars. "The Lacedæmonians," says Plutarch, "with a piece of parchment and a frieze coat, put an end to wars and laid seditions asleep very often without either shield or lance, and only by sending a single ambassador." As to "their defeat by Epaminondas," they were cer-

tainly defeated; but the war was at least as much the fault of the Thebans as theirs.

Our friend asks, "Was the Spartan happy when expiring at Diana's altar?" "He was," he says, "the victim of sanguinary laws, and bore the dreadful fate he was taught to admire." We said in our observations on our friend's former letter, that "the harshness of the Spartan discipline and customs was excessive." What is the use then of returning to this charge? and is it because this and a few other customs of hers were condemnable, that Sparta is not to be allowed that superiority which she possessed in most of her institutions? Nor did the law compel any one to "expire" or to undergo scourging "at Diana's altar." Neither did all the youths undergo this scourging; such as did, did so from their own choice: that choice was certainly influenced or rather formed by the education, the example, instruction, precepts, and habits which they received. But what can more forcibly, more decidedly show the irresistible power of education, or, of what education really consists of,—example, instruction, precepts, and habits? The Spartan was also prepared by the scourge at "Diana's altar," if, as was usually the case, he survived it, not to flinch from, not to dread any peril, any hardship, any privation, any suffering in the service of his country, or what he justly considered his country, his fellow-citizens. Thus were Leonidas and his Three Hundred nerved to face millions, to despise wounds and death, to devote themselves for their country, and to save it at Thermopylæ.

And might we not ask, Are the hundreds of thousands of starving beings, and the other hundreds of thousands of care-oppressed and passion-corroded beings, in what is called the present system of society, happy? The Spartan suffered by his own choice; we suffer entirely against our own choice. Of which then, him or us, should the unhappiness be said to be greater? No one starved or was in distress or in want, no one was oppressed with cares or corroded with passions, no one was torn by avarice, ambition, envy, jealousy, hatred, or any of our devouring passions at Sparta. Not even the Helot outside of Sparta famished or was in want of the necessities of life.

"What," our friend asks, "was virtue at Sparta?" What we have far too little of at present! With Montesquieu we already answered, "that love of equality which limited the Spartan's ambition" (ambition indeed, such a godlike passion cannot properly be called) "to the sole desire, the sole happiness of doing greater services to his coun-

try," that is to his fellow-citizens, "than the rest of his fellow-citizens" themselves. Virtue, with the Spartan, was the love of the equal welfare of all; the practice of this love; and the exertion of all his efforts was, that "every individual there should have the same advantages and the same happiness." Where is there nobler, higher, more generous virtue? Our friend says, "Virtue at Sparta was to stifle the voice of nature. The maternal tear was not shed, much less that of sympathy." He surely must be very forgetful, or he must have read her history very carelessly; for we cannot permit ourselves to say that he either has not read, or willingly misstates. The voice of Nature, except in bearing pain and braving danger with unflinching and undaunted resolution, was not stifled at Sparta; it was only differently and almost always better directed than with us. The voice of Nature was there taught to raise itself for the equal good of all; with us it is raised only for the individual good of self. "The maternal tear," our friend says, "was not shed." Did he never read of the Spartan mother who dropped dead from joy at seeing her son return safe from battle? Our friend should be a little more cautious in his assertions. The Spartan mother indeed would rather witness her child's death than ignominy; she would her own. If this be stifling the voice of nature, who can refuse it admiration? "The sympathetic tear was not shed!" Perhaps the Spartans were not given to "play the woman with their eyes." But all history says, that the sympathetic feeling for all was the universal passion at Sparta; the exertion for the good of all, the universal practice.

The next charge is, "adultery was approved and theft applauded." Did our friend never read the reply of Geradas the Spartan? and probably he knew as much of the manners and customs of the Spartans as our friend does. To a stranger who asked Geradas "what punishment their laws appointed for adulterers?" he replied, "My friend, there are no adulterers in Sparta." But said the other; "What, if there should be?" "Why then," said Geradas, "he must forfeit a bull so large, that he might drink of the Eurotas from the top of Mount Taygetus!" The stranger asked, "How can such a bull be found?" "Just," answered Geradas, "as an adulterer can be found at Sparta." We said in our former observations to our friend, on this subject, that "in few states was there in general such chastity, and in few was there less legal obligation." Montesquieu was of the same opinion; and the just quoted answer of Geradas fully sustains it. If the husband and wife wished to part and live with others, they

might do so ; but this they did not count adultery : and yet this very rarely occurred. If amongst us the husband and wife are legally divorced and live with others, it is not, either, counted adultery : and it is the opinion of some not unreflecting and not lightly deciding persons, that if divorce amongst us was much less difficult, adultery would be much more rare. What the Spartans counted adultery was either spouse's stealing a march on the other ; and this most rarely, if ever, occurred. Did our friend ever read what is written on one of the gates of the city of Agrah ? "The first year," says the inscription, "of the reign of Julof, two thousand husbands were voluntarily separated by the magistrates. The indignant emperor abolished divorce in consequence. Next year there were in Agrah three thousand marriages less, seven thousand cases of adultery more ; three hundred women were burned for having poisoned their husbands, seventy-five men were burned for the murder of their wives ; and three millions of rupees' worth of furniture was broken in domestic squabbles. The emperor re-established divorce."

Now as to theft, in our sense of theft, no such thing did, or indeed in any moral possibility could, exist at Sparta. Where there was community of property, what motive could there be to it ? The buccaneers of St. Domingo had community of property amongst them, and would count it unpardonable to have a lock on any door, chest, or trunk against one another. Theft from each other was consequently, even in their poverty and lawlessness, unknown amongst them. The Spartan youths indeed were encouraged to take things privily or unperceivedly from one another. But this was not for the sake of the thing, but for the dexterity of the action. Do not we often see a handkerchief taken through playfulness, without the owner's perceiving it, out of his pocket, without any design of theft ? The reason assigned for the custom at Sparta is, that should the Spartans ever be carried by war into an enemy's country, they might be the better able to procure their subsistence.

The Spartans are accused of infanticide. It was indeed, in the case of deformed infants, allowed there, but seldom practised. It is allowed at present in China in the case of all infants, however well-formed or sound, but is said to be of rare occurrence even there. We do not pretend to justify the commission of it in any case. But it was allowed at Sparta on a consideration, that life to an infirm or sickly person was instead of a blessing a curse, and that such a person could be of no use either to himself or his country. And

what is it to rear the greater part of a population to lead a life of want, and care, and misery? Is not this the case with us, and with almost every nation where individual property exists? Are not most infants who die a natural death amongst us said to be fortunate, as leaving a world of care, vicissitude, and trouble? and is not the saying just?

The *Cryptiæ* or private slaughter of the Helots was certainly a horrible, we allow our friend, "an execrable deed." But this appears to have been seldom resorted to. And when he talks of "*the dastard fears*" of the Spartans, he exposes himself to be laughed at. Have we also nothing as bad as the *Cryptiæ* amongst us? Do no hundreds and thousands who have laboured and toiled in the production of the country's wealth, die a cheerless, lingering, pining death of privation, wretchedness, and exhaustion amongst us? And is such a death much better than the sudden and unperceived end of the Helot by the sword or the javelin? All our friend's bowels of compassion seem to be alive only for the Helot of yore,—all his commiseration appears reserved for him. We too commiserate the Helot; but we do not confine our commiseration to him. We think we perceive a greater claim on it at home. Our friend asks, "What was community of property among the Spartans? If by the people," he adds, "we mean the mass of the population, artizans, labourers, &c., &c., the Helots were that people, and they were slaves." We grant that the Helots were slaves. But it does not appear that they ate or drank or were clad or lodged worse than the Spartans themselves, "the privileged citizens." If this then was the case, had not even they something of a community of property with "the privileged citizens?" Their labour was the wholesome labour of farming, and was probably not at all more, indeed rather less laborious than the exercise and discipline of "the privileged citizens;" for those "privileged citizens" were satisfied without sumptuousness, luxuries, or superfluities; and the labour which produced only such, could not be excessive. But how are our labouring classes situated? If a life of toil, and want, and uncertainty on the part of the labourers, though producing wealth in superabundance for others, be not a life of real slavery, or if not of slavery, of worse, we know not what is: and if it be, are our labouring classes so infinitely behind the Helots in the demand on our friend's compassionating organs or "tears of sympathy?"

But we perceive we have done our friend some injustice. We find

we should not have confined his pity entirely to the Helot. He lets a drop "of the aspersion sweet" fall on the "privileged citizens" themselves. "They had the right," he sobs, "of bearing, until thirty, a life of toil—until death, one of war. They had the privilege of being soldiers, of being called or dismissed at the caprice of the Ephori; and lastly, of living on a most wretched diet." Certainly the Spartan youth and young men to the age of thirty years were accustomed to bear hard exercise and fatigue. But we do not find that more of these was required of them than their constitutions could bear, or than rendered them probably the most hardy, robust, and vigorous race the world ever saw. Whether rearing them so as to render them thus, or bringing them up in softness, ease, and indolence, so as to render them delicate, luxurious, and nerveless, was more contributory to their real welfare, we shall leave to Mr. Abernethy and his brotherhood to decide. The Ephori, or any other magistrate, did not call the young or the old to war, as we have already stated, during upwards of a hundred and forty years at one period, and upwards of two hundred and twenty years at another. As to their "most wretched diet," it was such as maintained them in health and strength and vigour under trying severity of exercise and fatigue. They also seemed to like it. Our friend surely must at least have some not distant connection with the London aldermanic tribe, or he would remember the old adage that "Hunger is the best sauce." The Spartan black broth might not be very palatable to him or his *bons vivants* good friends, the London aldermen: but he should recollect that his or their palate could not have been the guide of the Spartan taste; and that a wrestling match, a plunge in the Eurotas, and a consequent sharp appetite might have made his black broth sweeter—perhaps Mr. Abernethy would add wholesomer, to the Spartan, than to the alderman his last night's surfeit, and his morning's easy chair can make his calapee and calapash.

Now as our friend bids here an adieu to Sparta, we shall sum up our opinion briefly, and (though we may hereafter instance her and refer to her example and institutions) once for all, about her. We do not consider, and we never quoted her as a model of our system. We adduced her as a proof of the possibility and practicability of the existence of community of property amongst a large society arrived at a high degree of knowledge and power. And we adduced her as an instance how far bare community of property, even without ad-

juncts, which we have it in our power and which we determine to call into our system, could exalt the human race. But we did not approve of all her practices or customs : on the contrary, we condemned some of them ; and even her community of property we think was too artificially or not simply enough arranged, while we entirely do and always did condemn its having been in some measure confined to the Spartans themselves, and not fully imparted to the Helots. We however, notwithstanding those practices, customs, and defects belonging to her which we disapprove, consider her during the full practice of Lycurgus's institutions, greatly superior in the real objects of life, in virtue and happiness, to any state or nation where individual property prevailed. What we most disapprove of in her, was of course her treatment of the Helots. Yet this we do not consider so bad as is generally fancied. Our reasons for not considering it so, we have already given. What induced her to make, or rather (for they were so before the time of Lycurgus) to continue the Helots slaves after the establishment of community of property amongst her own children, was that the latter should have time to acquire education and useful knowledge, health of mind and body, content, patriotism, and love for their fellow-citizens, strength, agility, and vigour. And she had a much greater excuse for continuing the Helots in slavery, than we have for continuing our labouring classes in that, or in worse. We have an inanimate substitute of vastly more power than the strength of the Helots ; we have machinery—machinery which would afford every individual of our population, labouring classes and all, as much leisure and as great an abundance of the external goods of life as he could desire ; and which is daily growing more and more powerful. Sparta was in the full practice of Lycurgus's laws for upwards of five hundred years ; and this was a longer space of tranquillity and universal competence, of absence of crime, disturbance or distress, than any other state, at least any state where individual property prevailed, ever, as far as we recollect, enjoyed. The cause of her not having continued till this day such as she was in her best time, we can easily find in the wars which were made on her ; in the Persian invasion of Greece ; in the ambition of Athens ; in her not having communicated to the Helots the fulness of her own liberty and community of property, and in the too great severity of some of her discipline.

But, with our friend, we now return from what he calls “ this di-

gression on Sparta," to his more direct attack on our system. "He asserted," he says, "that self-interest did not always guide the mind of man; and quoted the drunkard and the gamester." We said, "Self-interest and universal our system will make one—" 't will bid self-love and social be the same."—"Will not the combination be sufficient?" He seems to think not. What other interest then will he have? We cannot find it. We intimated, that of course it was according to our view of the interest we would act. If, consequently, our view of it was erroneous, we would act erroneously. He at one time allows this, and says, "Certainly." "It is an erroneous view," he adds, "which makes the Hindoo woman, &c. &c.—which in the name of liberty caused the reign of terror in France,—which will prove an insurmountable obstacle to your philanthropic intentions." Is there then, we ask, no possibility that we ever shall take a right view of our interests? He allows here, that this view only is wanting for the establishment of our system. Does he not see that the general mind is rapidly on the advance? does he not perceive that knowledge is fast marching forward? Will he say, that they have arrived at the utmost limit? will he pronounce, "so far thou shalt go, and no further?" If the French people had taken a correct view of liberty, and of the means of attaining and securing it, he seems to concede that they would not have had the reign of terror. Does not he imagine it possible that they may have gained something by experience, and may now take a more correct view?

But he seems still to be the Jeremiahan; he appears still to have an inclination for being the "prophet of ills,"—probably the cause of his lament on the want of the "tears of sympathy" at Sparta. His concession, as if fearing that it gave too great a dawn of hope, he now wishes to retract. "Individually, however," he says, "the drunkard has not such an erroneous view; he exclaims with Cassio,

"Oh that men should put an enemy in their mouths  
To steal away their brains!"

Does not our friend recollect, that it was after his brains were restored Cassio said this? The drunkard, when "putting the enemy in his mouth," the glutton, when "gulping his surfeit," think for the moment that the present pleasure will outweigh the future pain, if the pain should arrive,—which is not absolutely certain,—and they therefore quaff and gulp. They think present pleasure more their interest

for the moment, than abstinence from it. But if their apprehension of the future pain from the quaffing of the inebriation and "the gulping of the surfeit" were so strong as to render the present mental uneasiness greater than the sensual pleasure, the inebriation and the surfeit would undoubtedly be desisted from. If also there were some other, either mental or sensual innocent gratification, which would afford a greater pleasure than the inebriation or the surfeit, it would be resorted to, and the cup and the dish abandoned. Our system contemplates both impressing most forcibly the evil consequences of intemperate indulgences, and affording a constant variety of the most powerful innocent gratifications. Will this satisfy our lachrymatory friend? If it does not, what can stop his Niobe mood?

"Such," continues our tearful friend, "is the infirmity of the human mind, that you cannot amend it but by motives more powerful than the love of tranquillity, ease, reason, or benevolence. An Alexander fires our mind,—a Howard is almost forgotten;—Napoleon thrived in wars and difficulties, and pined in peace."

Why has not our friend told us what those more powerful motives are? The fundamental motive of all human action is the love of happiness. Let us, then, be deeply enough impressed with the proportionate tendency of every action to our happiness, and we shall inevitably act, while we can act according to our will, as we should. No one ever wished to be unhappy rather than happy. Let us be taught—convinced, that acting like Howard will make us more happy than acting like Alexander, and Alexander will no longer fire our minds. He did not fire the mind of a Fenelon; he did not fire the mind of a Howard. Napoleon took a mistaken view of what would tend to his happiness: he was taught by the false splendour which most historians, orators, and poets throw on conquest, power, and glory, that they were the means of arriving at happiness; he accordingly sought them. If he were taught otherwise, he would seek peace, and not pine in it.

"Napoleon, Cæsar, William the Conqueror, Cromwell, Wat Tyler," our friend opposes to "Socrates, Epaminondas, Aristides, &c.," and asks, "what kind of Co-operation would they have formed?" I answer, That if they had received such an education as was requisite for them, they would have formed a very good Co-operation. If they were taught to view actions and things in their true light; if they were taught by example as well as by practice: if they received good

customs and habits as well as good rules and instructions,—there can be no question that their Co-operation would be good. The great and good Boerhaave exclaimed, when he saw a criminal led to execution, “Who knows but I might have done worse, had I been in the same circumstances!”—the same circumstances, he meant, as to education, example, means, necessity, and other things.

Our friend comes now to education, and has a fling at it. “You rely,” he says to us, “on education, on the knowledge of the arts, &c. Alas! have you forgot that Nero was a fiddler, and the late David a terrorist? From Dionysius to Louis the XIth, from Wolsey to Talleyrand, how many clever rascals have there been!”—“The first slaves,” he adds, “of Buonaparte were his supporters; and among them we may number some, who for the sake of literature and science I will not name. Education exalts the human mind, but does not equalize men. Education gives refinement, but neither honesty nor humanity.”

Really our friend does not seem to be very liberal to education. His view of it does not appear such as the great Bacon’s. “Certainly custom,” says Bacon, “is most perfect when it beginneth in young years: this we call EDUCATION, which is in effect but an early custom.” Now, with Bacon, we do not consider literature, languages, the sciences and arts, more than the minor part of education. Teaching the mind to reason rightly, leading it to a knowledge of what will most promote its happiness, imparting to mind and body good customs, and training them to good habits, we deem giving the better part of education. We think, also, that education is not finished till our customs and habits are formed; and that example is as necessary, or at least nearly so, as instruction or regulation, to form them. If all men, then, received good education,—an education of precept, instruction and example, of regulation, custom and habits,—and such an education we do not conceive it impossible that all men shall receive at some future period,—we are confident that our system would be universally adopted, and would universally flourish.

But of all the parts of education, we conceive customs and habits the most powerful. “Men’s minds,” says Bacon, “are much according to their inclination; their discourse and speeches according to their learning and infused opinions; but their deeds are after as they have been accustomed: and therefore, as Machiavel noteth well, there is no trusting to the force of nature, nor to the bravery of

words, except it be corroborated by nature." "Force," he says, "maketh nature more violent in return; doctrine and discourse make nature less important; but custom only doth alter nature." "Therefore," he observes again, "since custom is the principal magistrate of man's life, let men by all means endeavour to obtain good customs."

Now Nero's education, we believe, was deficient in "custom." He was reared in luxury, and accustomed to indulgence. He was educated too, to fiddle; and he was, as our friend says, "a fiddler." Seneca's instructions, or, as Bacon says, "doctrine and discourse, made his nature," or perhaps rather his inclinations, formed by early example and indulgence, "less importune." But the customs he was bred up in prevailed. Seneca was neglected: he set Rome on fire, and he fiddled. But what has his fiddling gained for our friend? Whether Wolsey and Talleyrand are justly honoured or not by the polished designation of "scoundrels," we shall not take on ourselves to decide. Talleyrand, perhaps, would answer for himself and his *eminent* brother, if our friend applied to him. If, however, the designation were ever so well merited, our friend has not shown that they had the education on which we rely, and on which Bacon seems confident. Did our friend never hear the saying, "a moral education?" Or does he think that education is confined to what is called learning, or to literature and the arts and sciences altogether? The education which we rely on is not this confined one; it is a moral at least as much as a learned one; and one formed by example, custom and habit, as much as by instruction. Did Wolsey and Talleyrand receive this? If they did not, they are no instances against the power of what we rely on; and our friend has not attempted to show that they did. But even if such an education was early commenced with them, it was abandoned before established. "In our days," says Montesquieu, "we receive three different or contrary educations, namely, that of our parents, that of our masters, and that of the world. What we learn in the latter, effaces all ideas of the former." Education in our system would be the same throughout our lives;—it would be "*usque ad finem*," as it was with the ancients, when, according to Montesquieu, "they performed things unseen in our times, and such as are capable of astonishing our little souls;" when "Epaminondas the last year of his life said, heard, saw and performed the very same things as at the age in which he received the first principles

of his education." If Nero, if Wolsey and Talleyrand, if Buonaparte, had received such an education, they would not have been "scoundrels."

Our friend says, "The first slaves of Buonaparte were his supporters." Did they receive the education which we rely on? We fearlessly say, they did not. Our education would give "honesty and humanity" still more studiously, more strenuously than "refinement." Our friend says, "Education exalts the mind, but does not equalize men." We never said that it did or would "equalize men." All our friend's scepticism in the power of education is not necessary to enable us to see that no education can make a natural idiot a Bacon or a Newton: but a good system would apply to the idiot and to Bacon and Newton equal advantages of education, of rights and property, as far as they were capable of receiving and enjoying them. This is all the equality which our system contemplates; this all we ever spoke of; and we did not need our kindly didactic friend's profound monition "not to dream" of any other. He allows that "education exalts the mind." And what is the real "exaltation of the mind?" Is it not the raising of it from that low and base exclusive selfishness\*, which indeed excludes a man from seeing his own real happiness more than he seeks that of others, to the truly elevated, the sublime, and godlike contemplation of the unbounded diffusion of good, of the unlimited extension of happiness to all? "Power to do good," says Bacon, "is the true and lawful end of aspiring:" and whenever the mind aspires to anything else, it does not aspire to the highest, most hallowed exaltation, to what Bacon designates as "of all virtues and dignities of the mind the greatest, being the character of the deity; and without which man is a busy, mischievous, wretched thing, no better than a kind of vermin." This exaltation is what our education would lift the mind to: and if it had lifted the minds of Nero himself and our friend's "scoundrels and slaves" to this, can he not imagine it possible that even they would have "formed a community and a good kind of Co-operation?"—They all may not be equal in bodily or mental powers, in strength or activity, in intellect or genius; but they all would have equal external means of promoting their individual own and

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\* "It is," says Bacon, "a poor centre of a man's actions, himself. It is right earth."

one another's happiness, as far as they could promote it; and they would promote it as far as their bodily and mental powers would allow.

Indeed, if our friend had insisted on the difficulty of giving to all the education which we rely on, he would have taken up the strongest ground, which he could, for the contest against us, or for maintaining his opinion of the impracticability of our system. "How," he might have asked, "can those who have had a contrary education give that which you desire, if the power of education be so great as you maintain?" But few have had an altogether contrary education. Most of us have had, as has before been quoted, "three different and contrary educations." The education of early precept and of the pages of wisdom and morality, is in conflict with that of custom and example. This, together with real happiness's, being on the side of the first education, renders the latter not so omnipotent as it otherwise would be. The love of happiness, which is Nature's most powerful impulse, we never, while animation lasts, can get rid of; and however we may err in the paths of satisfying this love, if we are made fully to perceive the true path, we shall be inclining towards it—"Naturam furcâ expellas licet," says the poet, "*usque recurret.*"

We do not, we cannot expect that our desired education will be given generally and immediately, or therefore that our system will at once be universally adopted or instantly carried into full operation. We do not even hope, though of course we would wish, that even if universally adopted, it would be carried into full operation by the present generation. The customs, the habits of acting, of thinking, already acquired, would still be drawing back. We cannot expect that the first establishments founded on its principles, will enjoy the full effects of the system, or even that some of them may not fall,—but probably to rise again.

We do however expect that such of the first establishments, as are conducted with a moderate degree of prudence and not entered on with insufficient means, will greatly advance the happiness of the members, and that the general adoption of the system is not hopeless, or even so far distant as most persons think. We do not despair of the cause of mankind. We do not think we are fated always to remain in the same state of agitation, of conflict, of suffering, which, bodily or mental, is at present so general, I had almost said universal. Dugald Stewart and some other high authorities have been already shown to have had anticipations of a brighter day also. Even the

present generation may witness the dawn. Even we, though often drawn back and turned aside by our previously acquired customs and habits, would be daily growing more and more reconciled to the new ones, and we would daily find them more and more "the ways of pleasantness and paths of peace." "By accustoming ourselves to any course of action," says Butler in his Analogy, "we get an aptness to go on, a facility, readiness, and often pleasure in it. The inclination which rendered us averse to it, grows weaker: the difficulties in it, not only the imaginary, but the real ones, lessen: the reasons for it offer themselves of course to our thoughts upon all occasions: and the least glimpse of them is sufficient to make us go on in a course of action to which we have been accustomed: and thus a character new in several respects may be formed." Who would have thought, that from "the dross of this country, from the dregs of our impurity, such a people as that of the United States would be formed? Who would have contemplated, that the robbers and rabble of Romulus, could become such a nation as that in which a Cincinnatus, a Regulus, a Fabricius were not uncommon? Who could have believed that from a people, "where," as the accurate Mitford says, "the poor suffered from the oppression of the rich; the rich were in perpetual danger from the despair of the poor; where laws neither restrained nor protected, and dark fraud or open and atrocious violence was the unceasing produce of avarice, suspicion and misery"—that such a people could be converted by Lycurgus into "a whole city of philosophers," where every one had competence; and safety, order, tranquillity and harmony presided?

The succeeding generations, as being trained in the principles, the customs and habits of the system, will carry it into fuller operation than the present can; the following generation than that again, and each successive than the preceding. Custom will be growing stronger and stronger, and knowledge will be more and more advancing; and what fear can we then rationally entertain that people will wish to plunge back into the "sea of troubles" from which they have emerged?

But our friend will not be satisfied without punishments. He seems unable to reconcile our "allowance" of the punishments of the laws of the country, while those laws are necessary, and our disclaiming of punishments when they become unnecessary. He laughs at our "*bon-homme*" in this. No one of course can prevent his enjoying

his chuckle and the luxury of punishment, whether necessary or not, if he wishes it; but for our own part, we prefer even the "*bon-homme*," (simple and ludicrous as he conceives it,) which leads to dispense with this sauce for our dish, when unnecessary, to his eagle-eyed penetration, which makes him think he cannot digest any morsel, however wholesome, without it. We imagine, with an author before quoted, that "it is better, instead of arming the hand of the executioner against the effect, at once to remove the cause;" and we conceive,—probably our penetrating friend will say, "we do so from *bon-homme*,"—that when the cause and effects are removed, what was intended to restrain the effects may be removed also, especially when allowed on all hands to be an evil. We remember to have read in Livy, that at a certain period it was only necessary to show the Romans what they should do. "The people of Rome," says Montesquieu, "had some probity. Such was its force, that the legislator had frequently no further occasion than to point out the right road to induce them to follow it; instead of precepts, it was sufficient to give them counsels." We imagine our system would bring its followers to this state: and when it does, we confess we are so simple as not to see the use of our friend's loved punishments. His anecdote about Cromwell's cutting off the head of Charles the First and not suffering a hair of it to be touched, we cannot, such is our obtuseness, clearly see the bearing of.—Can it be to show the delectableness of punishments? We allow him all the advantage of it: we hope, however, he will not be the object of such a one as Charles's.

Our friend thinks there is great inconsistency in our not inflicting the punishments of the law in our communities, and in allowing the tribunals established by the country to inflict them while necessary. And what does he think of all companies and families in the present system? Do they inflict the punishments of the law themselves on the offending members, or do they allow the public authorities to inflict them?

Our friend says, "You" (meaning us) "admit that other ties than those of self-interest are necessary to restrain the deviations of morbid or vitiated minds." It is necessary to restrain a madman sometimes in a strait-waistcoat; but to a sane man, we know no tie so powerful to restrain or actuate him as his view of self-interest and social united. This view, as we said before, our system would give him; and it would give him a correct view. And what but some view of its self-

interest actuates even the morbid or vitiated mind? Correct the view, and you correct the action.

We are made by our friend to say with Eloisa, "Curse on all laws but those which love has made;" and "in matters of judgement he begs to relinquish love's legislature." Our friend misquotes us a little; whether for the sake of trying a tilt at wit or not, we will not attempt to decide. The quotation from us should be, "We would almost say, Curse on all laws but those where love presides." Which then does our friend mean to say, that marriage is no matter of judgement, or that love should be altogether excluded from it? We can hardly believe he would wish his wife to think he means either. We confess, notwithstanding our friend's experienced hint, we would wish no marriage where love did not preside.

He says, "the Eloisas who will frequent our communities will bring forth few Abelards. They might seem ultra-platonic in their eyes." He seems to know the secrets of Nature. We hope, however, Nature will not be more unkind to our Eloisas than to others. We read that poor Abelard was a lover; but we did not before think that he was a platonic, much less an ultra-platonic one. Our friend seems to have forgotten much of his gallantry, his devotion to the ladies, since he wrote his former letter.

He endeavours to laugh at our contemplating our system's rescuing 200,000 unfortunate females from depravity and misery; and he thinks that because in our communities no female would be forced by necessity to submit to such degradation as those poor creatures are reduced to, "the term *bagnio* is not inapplicable to them." So then, where there is no need for *bagnios*, *bagnios* must be. This is much of the same reasoning as that of our friend's wanting punishments, where punishments are not needful. We can only say "*De gustibus non est disputandum*"—every one to his taste. If our friend is so attached to *bagnios* and punishments, he of course will take arms against our system; and we are too busy in endeavouring to defend it, to defend him from himself. Yet if he had not shed all his "sympathetic tears" over the bloodshed and oppression of the barbarian Spartans" awhile ago, we would think this an occasion for one of them rather than for an attempted sneer. Many of "those unfortunate beings," we allow, "*united in the first instance from affection and choice, from the warm feelings of the heart.*" But why were they deserted? why left "to rove the streets exposed to every

wretchedness, obliged to bear every abomination?" Are they not, in general, of the most beautiful of the sex? were they not once "sweet as the primrose peeps beneath the thorn?" Yes; but they had not wealth or high connections.

Our friend tells us, we shall want "a few old cooks and washerwomen; and bricks, and ploughs." We thank him for his very instructive information. We have seen young washerwomen and cooks; and we do not see why young may not do as well as old. Steam-washing and good cooking apparatus would assist them; and make what is a toil a pleasure. "Bricks and ploughs" we never said we intended to dispense with; nor do we intend to do so, till we can find better materials and implements. But is the ploughman worse for being able to find pleasure in a book? Or is our friend as much attached to ignorance, as to punishments and bagnios? He laughs at the balloon. The philosophic Franklin did not do so. When asked what was the use of the balloon; he asked what was the use of a child? Would not the child be a man? But our friend, we suppose, with his peculiar modesty considers Franklin "a sanguine and theoretical," as he despises the knowledge of Xenophon, Aristotle, Plutarch, and other such visionaries about the Spartans.

He however becomes, he tells us, serious. "Allow me," he says, "the necessity of laws and the means of enforcing them; offer the means of defence against foreign foes and domestic sedition; offer me protection for commerce. Establish yourselves remote from a society whose customs, manners and luxuries are repugnant to your innovations, or else you will melt amidst the surrounding people. The Spartans became corrupted. Plato quotes a proverb—*We see a great deal of money go to Sparta, but none ever comes back.* Above all, do not dream of equality among men. You are a bachelor, or else with your friend Lycurgus, I would say, 'Go try in thine own family'."

Most of this seriousness has been answered already. As for his favourite punishments, "his means of enforcing," they have been disposed of. He may administer the sweet draught, if he must have it, to himself, and enjoy it. For defence against a foreign foe, our Communities would always be prepared. For inward sedition there would be as little fear as there was at Sparta while community of property was adhered to. We explained the causes of the corruption of Sparta. She was growing corrupt in Plato's time, and in the time of the proverb which he quotes, "when money went to her, and she kept it."

There is no probability of the occurrence of such causes of corruption amongst us as were amongst the Spartans. We will show all nations that they can produce for themselves with the greatest facility and in the greatest abundance, as well as we. What foreign foe will then wish to invade us? Should any however attempt it, he will find us always prepared. Every community will have its regiment well trained, well disciplined, strengthened by exercise, suppled and invigorated by gymnastics. Every one will have its most powerful enginery of destruction, if necessary to be used. For commerce also, every community near the sea-coast will have its ship; every ship will have its enginery. Laws are or should be but publicly chosen regulations of action and conduct. We shall have those; for enforcing them we shall have the knowledge that they conduce to our individual own, as well as to the universal common good; for enforcing them we shall have the equal interest of all. The kind of equality which we shall have, I before explained—equality or community of rights, equality or community of property. He would, he says, with my friend Lycurgus, say to me, only that I am a bachelor, ‘Go, try in thy own family.’ I hope, if I were not a bachelor, I would not be the despot in my own family: I hope, nay I know, my friend is not in his own. Lycurgus gave equality of property at Sparta; but with such an ignorant and ill-trained, ill-educated population as he found there, it was no wonder that he should keep authority in the hands of knowledge. He, however, divested authority of what makes it injurious; he divested it of wealth, of superior property. The King, the Ephori, the Three Hundred, ate, drank, were clothed, were lodged no better than the other citizens. “Two kings,” says Montesquieu, “could be borne in no other state but Sparta.” Why so? Because in no other state was community of property established equally for kings and for subjects. Had we a wife and children every way our equals in knowledge and habits, and having but one interest, we should readily give them equal authority. They would then feel an equal interest in promoting our welfare as their own. But till the children grew our equals in knowledge and good habits, we would keep authority in more knowing hands, as Lycurgus did at Sparta. Most of the Spartans were, before the establishment of his institutions, children in knowledge and good habits. Therefore he retained authority with the wisest. Yet it is wonderful how soon, almost how suddenly, community of property imparted growing knowledge and good habits to all of them in general. It gave all of them an equal and the same interest.

But our friend wants doubts on our part, to be himself convinced. Crossing from Dover to Calais once we were, a little tossed up and down by a smart breeze which sprung up. A very interesting little girl in the packet became somewhat frightened; and asked the Captain, Were we in any danger? "Not in the smallest," says he. "O Captain, surely we must be a little." "None in the world, Miss." "O now Captain, surely in some little; do now Captain, allow a little, little:"—and we were immediately in Calais. So our friend wants "some little doubts." "Offer him," he says, "some little doubts. Give him some little difficulties—but such blindfolded trust in success seldom assures the mind." The little girl thought the Captain's confidence of his safety, "blindfolded trust," when on the point of entering the harbour. If he expressed "some little danger," then she would be satisfied, her "mind would be assured." We allowed our friend more "difficulties," though no doubts where we saw none, than the Captain did the little girl. But we hope we shall equally find ourselves "safely landed in Calais."

"An hemisphere," our friend says, "will soon separate us; twenty years will elapse before I can return. I trust I may find you still labouring in the cause; but I fear, in all probability, with no more success." We most sincerely wish our friend a happy voyage; we also wish him the acquisition of what he goes in quest of—wealth, because he will not see the vanity of it till he finds it. We wish likewise that he may obtain it before twenty years; and most happy should we assuredly be, to see him return in health and spirits with it, whenever he returns. But we trust, if he returns even in half twenty years he will find us not "still labouring," if by labouring he means toiling in "doubt or difficulty, in the cause." There is an approach to a Community at Orbiston in Scotland. This we hope, nay are almost confident, will be fully a Community, and a prosperous one, before ten years. There are four Communities already on Mr. Owen's lands of New Harmony in America. There were five; but one of them it seems is broken up. Still the four others are prospering; and the fifth we have little doubt will soon be re-established. Owen experienced at New Lanark, before he brought it to be a prosperous establishment, greater difficulties than he has done at New Harmony. Some of our co-operative friends here are collecting funds and forming minds and habits for a Community near this metropolis. We have ground to hope with confidence it will be commenced within a year. If it be, with the human materials which we know are prepared, we have

no doubt of its success. We are confident if those materials come together, they will strengthen one another in acting on their principles. "Certainly," says Bacon, "the multiplication of virtues upon human nature resteth upon societies \* well ordained and disciplined." We have no doubt that the contemplated Community will prove this. "If," says the great mind just quoted, "the force of custom, simple and separate, be great, the force of custom, copulate and conjoined and collegiate, is far greater: for there example teacheth, company comforteth, emulation quickeneth, glory raiseth; so as in such places the force of custom is in its exaltation." Custom in our contemplated Community will be founded on reason, and will have all the advantages which Bacon mentions, except that for "emulation and glory" it will have more powerful ones,—that goodness, which he says the Greeks call philanthropia, (and which he pronounces "of all virtues and dignities of the mind the greatest") and the knowledge of the true paths to happiness. The members will confirm each other in the habits of the system; and they will do so even for the sake of their children: for they will remember, that "example is better than precept;" they will remember the advice of an elegant writer to parents, "to be themselves what they would wish their children to be, if they would have them so;" they would remember, as Montesquieu says, that "the surest way of instilling virtue into children, is for parents to set them the example." Of a Community so actuated and so acting, then, may not even our friend's tremulous apprehension be satisfied with, if he must have "some little doubt," the very smallest?

When he returns, as we trust he will, with the object of his search,—with wealth in superabundance, and finds, as, if he so returns, we are sure he will, the emptiness of it, and that it is not what bestows happiness,—we hope, notwithstanding his fears for us, he will find us, not "still labouring" in his "little doubts or difficulties," but in the successful enjoyment of what we are in search of—happiness and a Community,—that he will find, and join us *safely landed in Calais*.—ED.

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\* Is it not pretty evident that he had in view such societies as those we contemplate? After saying, that "the multiplication of virtues rests on societies well ordained and disciplined," he adds, "for Commonwealths and good Governments do nourish virtue grown, but do not much mend the seed; but the misery is, that the most effectual means are now applied to the ends least to be desired."

## DUBLIN ECONOMICAL SOCIETY.

As the proposals of this contemplated Society approximate to those of our system, we gladly lay them before our readers. Any plan or proceeding that has any tendency to the great end, we should feel great pleasure in promoting by every means in our power.

## PROPOSALS FOR THE FORMATION OF AN ECONOMICAL SOCIETY, IN DUBLIN.

It is proposed,—

That a number of Gentlemen shall form themselves into a *select* Society, each to pay an entrance fee of £5. to constitute a capital for the purchase of the best materials of which their Dress consists, *from Manufacturers, for cash only.*

In this way the *wholesale and retail profits, warehouse and shop-rents, taxes, commissions, discounts, stamps and insurance of bad debts*, of both Merchant and Shopkeeper, will be saved; and all the *inconvenience and risk of retail purchasing* be avoided.

By establishing a *direct intercourse between the Manufacturers and Consumers*, the former (in hopes of constantly supplying the demand of the latter) will furnish goods of the *best quality*, made up in the *fairest manner*, unlike the inferior articles now passed off on unwary purchasers, by aid of *expensive and injurious dressing and decorations.*

It is further proposed,—

That the articles of Dress shall be made up by eligible Journeymen, employed by the Society, and under its immediate inspection.

This arrangement will further save *shop-rents, taxes, profits, &c.* of Masters, on “making up,” and avoid the *delays and disappointments* incident on the differences between Masters and Journeymen.

When at least one hundred Gentlemen shall have agreed to unite for the purpose above specified, a meeting will be convened; when such arrangements can be made as may be considered necessary.

## REVIEW.

“*The Revolt of the Bees.*” pp. 272. Longman, Rees, Orme, Brown, and Green, Paternoster Row.

(Continued from No. 5, page 240.)

THE bees henceforward to page 265, near the end of the work, are only spectators and auditors; and the two young friends, Saadi and Douglas, become the chief heroes of the scene. But they are certainly much more instructive, as well as much more worthy of being admired

and imitated than most other heroes either of imagination or of reality. Saadi is not fully master of the system, and mentions what at first sight appear to him difficulties in it. His questions lead Douglas to give a full development of it, and to answer all the objections which are usually brought against it, at least those of any plausibility. Their conversation opens in a very interesting manner, as follows :

"Pardon," exclaimed Saadi, "my delay, but I could not forbear pausing to admire the sublimity of this scene. Yet how much is the interest heightened by the reflection, that in that beautiful valley the inhabitants are enjoying a repose in harmony with the heavenly tranquillity that reigns around them ; that, undisturbed by angry passions or by a spirit of rivalry, they will awake in the morning to the sound of music, and go forth to the enjoyment of healthful and useful exercise, of intelligent and affectionate intercourse." The sensibility of Saadi was strongly excited, and he averted his head as if to conceal his feelings. "Is it possible," said Douglas, "that you should wish to disguise those sympathies which are so grateful to yourself, so pleasing to others, and which it must be the general interest to encourage !" "Such sentiments," replied Saadi, "in Persia are deemed fit only for romance\*. *Address yourself on this subject to a merchant of Is-pahan, he smiles at your simplicity, and passes on with his richly laden caravan. Our nobles, encumbered with the pomp and ceremonies of a court, are equally indifferent to the charms of nature and to the moral improvement of the people. But alas ! they are far from being happy. And I have frequently remarked, that while their countenances indicate care and anxiety, the camel drivers, who endure more privations and encounter infinitely greater perils than any other of their own class, are contented and even cheerful.*"

Saadi gives an account of his education ; and such an education it were to be wished, were more common amongst the children and youth of his rank in this as well as in every other country. He then asks Douglas to enlighten him with some detail of the different laws of the societies.

"Our laws," replied Douglas, "are few and simple : indeed we have almost forgotten the term : it is only where the institutions themselves generate disorder, that numerous or severe laws become necessary. Examine the ancient European codes, and you will find that nine-tenths of them

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\* If the term *romantic* implies that which is unnatural, fictitious, or extravagant, then are the men who are generally deemed romantic, the least deserving of the epithet. Those are the romantic, who, blind to the beauties of Nature and regardless of her best gifts, search for happiness in the artificial distinctions of society, or solely in the pursuit of wealth.

were framed for the recognition of the rights of private property, or for punishing the violaters of those rights. History informs us, that long before the fall of the competitive system in this country, notwithstanding vast numbers of the people were occasionally unemployed, a superfluity of food and of raiment was produced, yet the great mass of the people were struggling to obtain these necessities, many suffering great privations, and many tempted to commit depredations to satisfy the calls of nature. The interests of some individuals were opposed to those of others. If, for instance, the wants and condition of the people required that the price of corn should be low and the quantity abundant, it was the interest of the dealer that the supply should be contracted, and the price high. The personal quarrels and assaults also arising out of this chaos, rendered many punitive laws necessary; to say nothing of those feuds and bickerings of which the laws took no cognizance, prevailing among individuals of dissimilar habits and pursuits dwelling together in the same family. In fact, there was a perpetual jarring of interests in every direction; and the longer the duration of the system, the more difficult and complicated jurisprudence became. Under our arrangements, the private and public interests are incorporated; and as there are no unsatisfied wants, there can arise no motive for individual appropriation: our storehouses are furnished with two or three years supply of every imperishable article requisite to the community. It is the obvious interest of every individual that there should be an ample supply for all,—for who is there among them that is not benefited by the preservation of order and contentment, even if he be devoid of common sympathy? and you must have observed in our mode of education, with how much care that valuable quality is cultivated.

“Each individual member of a family has two private rooms, and is no more compelled to be with his own family, than with any other individuals of the community; he is at full liberty to seek for the companionship of congenial minds. Every member in rotation is enabled to travel; and if he desires to reside in another part of the country, he can dispose of his interest in the community in which he has been educated. While the competitive state of society left individuals separately to procure the necessities of life, thereby creating innumerable difficulties and evils,—the co-operative state, by supplying with facility under comprehensive arrangements, the whole of its members with food, raiment, and dwelling, annihilates at once the cause of contention, of anxieties and of misery, and bestows upon mankind abundant leisure to improve their higher faculties, and to promote the happiness of the species.”

But if we were to go on extracting every striking passage, or every one worthy of being dwelt and seriously reflected on, we should extract almost the entire work. Therefore, observing that particularly

towards the end of the work, the reader will meet with many truly eloquent passages, we shall give only one extract more, and that the passage with which the work closes.

At the fifth revolution, a far greater change had taken place than in any of the preceding. Wealth, which had before laid in masses, was now beneficially diffused and greatly increased. And now prevailed the invaluable riches of the mind, and all the virtues flourished ;—for ignorance with its train of follies and vices had fled, never more to return. The lion dwelt in peace with the lamb, the eagle and the turtle-dove took their flight together. The waters gushed out in the dry places, and the wilderness became converted into rich pastures. In the desert bloomed the myrtle and the rose, while the clustering vine sprang up bearing its purple fruit. The lowly hut was supplanted by the convenient and splendid edifice ; and the whole earth exhibited indescribable magnificence and beauty.

As the storm passed away, these fairy scenes melted into air, and the moon arose in calm and unclouded majesty, casting her mild radiance over the humid plains. The Genius waved his wand, and suddenly, a lunar rainbow, rising from the summit of the mountain, extended over the country to the Pentland Hills. A light billowy cloud appeared, bearing an aerial chariot, the wheels of which resembled the rich golden colours of the setting sun ; the body was of a rosy hue, and formed like a hive. The Genius ascended the chariot, while the innumerable silken traces of the finest tenuity were borne by the bees, who thus conducted the Spirit over the Iris to their native hills.

Now we shall proceed to our strictures.—We have before observed, that of the machinery of the work we could not speak with unqualified commendation. The title would convey the idea that the bees are to be the entire actors ; and though we are aware that the story or fable is only allegorical, still we expect that it should be kept up throughout, and the beings implied by the title and introduced by the opening of the work as the *dramatis personæ*, the performers, not be entirely thrown into the back-ground. They should, to preserve the unity in any tolerable manner, appear on the stage at least in every act. This, certainly, it would require great ingenuity to effect, in conjunction with the accomplishment of the author's object. But perhaps the severe critic would say that the author should make out allegorical beings, in the management of whom this could be fulfilled, if it could not with those he has taken ; or that he should have dropped allegory altogether.

Another objection may be made to the author's management, in his

giving to his allegorical beings employments totally foreign to their natures, and such as they never have been, or ever will be engaged in. When did bees ever dig into the bowels of the earth? when plunge into the depth of the mine, in quest of gold or silver, of iron, tin or any other metal? Their having *Legislatores*, *Judicatores*, and *Ecclesiastes*, though a pretty good stretch of probability, especially their having the last, may be supposed possible, and therefore may be pardoned. But their construction of machinery to extract honey with, and their fabrication of *papyrus* and use of the press, does not at all fall in with any idea ever entertained of them; though not altogether so absurd as sending them to mine,—for what use could they make of the mine's materials? Iron is almost absolutely necessary to man; and gold, silver, copper are, though we allow not in the shape of money, useful. He finds the first very advantageous in producing most of his absolute necessities, and his nearly necessary comforts and conveniences; and the latter, gold, silver, and copper, furnish him with many serviceable, not to speak of ornamental, articles. Bees, however, can make no use of either.

Might not our author have obviated these objections by a dexterous management of the bees themselves? Might he not have accomplished his purpose by bringing some of them, who had never strayed from the paths of nature, of justice and happiness, to a race whose ancestors had wandered so widely from those paths, that their descendants entirely lost, or rather never had sight of them? The visitors could explain their own happy state to their fallen brethren, whom they could take back on a visit in turn with them to their own homes, and to whom they could relate what they had seen amongst men, some of whom they might have been made to know living in co-operative communities, and using as the Benlomonders have been made to do, only glass bee-hives? Perhaps, indeed, it would be more difficult than the trouble would be worth, nay impossible, to do this, so as to make the design clear enough to the common reader. If this would be the case, and we fear it would, the arrangement, with “all its imperfections on its head,” if imperfections they can be called, is, as being more useful, more to be approved, as it is. We pardon Shakspeare's Plays and most of the English drama, their want of unity of time and place; because it is imagined indispensable to their greatest beauties, and they would be more incomplete without it.

We have also before said that our author seemed defective in his arrangement of dates, and laying before us the progressive stages of

advancement. At one time he says that those Benlomond Communities are "nearly a century in advance of the present period;" yet at another he tells us of occurrences and transactions of the present period, as of what had long since passed. Again, here presents the Benlomonders in the highest state, or at least,—for even the state which in such glowing colours he has depicted, we do not consider as near the highest to which Co-operative Community is destined to carry man,—in a very advanced state of co-operative and communal perfection; while all the rest of mankind continue still in all the misery of competition and individuality. Surely he cannot suppose, that if the system of Co-operative Community were seen to confer half as much happiness, and advancement in the arts and sciences, the comforts and conveniences, the splendours and refinements of life as he describes, on several communities in any one part of such a country,—a country so full of misery, and where communication is so rapid,—as this, the rest of it would remain a day longer in its present deplorable state. We may as well think that a person would not wish to step from the gloom and torments of a Tartarus, into the glories and bliss of an Elysium if he saw it open to him.

But a greater fault in such a work,—a work intended for useful instruction, and the best manner of promoting the system,—is in our opinion the want of showing the progressive stages of advancement. Persons on reading this work, if persuaded by its reasoning, as we think if impartially reflecting they must be, would be apt to imagine that they had nothing to do but to join in communities in order to be in the immediate enjoyment of all the advantages and felicities which he describes. But no such thing could take place, even if the government and the people were universally to adopt the system, and yet further to take it up with all their energies. There must even then be a season of labour, of arrangement, and of the formation of new trains of thinking and new habits of acting, before such a day of glories as he paints, could arrive.

To be sure, when, according to M. Dupin and other accurate calculators, *twenty-seven thousand* men could do as much in the present state of science and machinery, as at least *six hundred million* could have done in the times of building the pyramids of Egypt, or even probably within less than a hundred years ago, the labour of realizing even such, apparently at present illusionary, splendours of architectural and other accommodations would be little, if we all, government and people, universally or even generally united and acted with accord;

or as the saying is, pulled, even without the long, with "the strong pull, and the pull all together." But even then to change our long-formed customs and habits, though evidently to the promotion of our own welfare and happiness, would take a much longer time. Indeed the example of Lycurgus and the Spartans shows us in what a comparatively short time a total change even in those can be effected by a united effort of government and people. Yet even at Sparta it was not accomplished in a moment. The illustrious lawgiver was abused and lost his eye in the completion.

If then such a state of universal advancement could not be suddenly or at once brought about by the combined exertions of government and people,—how can it be hoped that it could by isolated portions of the people alone, with but small capital or means? And if it can not, is not leading persons to expect it, injurious? He might, according to the critic's rules for an epic poem, have rushed into the midst of affairs at once, and given the first view of his communities in all their lustre. Perhaps the effect would be more striking. But in our opinion he ought afterwards to have described the difficulties attending the first formation and establishment of them, and the progressive stages of their advancement. He would thus have taught communities struggling with the almost necessary difficulties surrounding the commencement of their undertaking, not to be discouraged, and this would be a most useful object. The omission in this we conceive the most material, indeed the only very material defect of the work.

The few inaccuracies in point of language, where composition and style are in general so correct and beautiful, we should scarcely notice, only to show our impartiality, and to call the author's attention to correct in succeeding editions—which we are sure of, or public taste and judgement must be very deficient—what we know only escaped him through inadvertency. We do not think the following portion of a sentence quite correct, at least elegant; "and *it* might be said of him, *what* the historian has remarked of Atticus." *What* is *that which*: if these words were put instead of *what*, they would make the expression very awkward. We should prefer "and *that* might be said of him, *which* the historian said of Atticus," or "*it* might be said of him, *as the* &c."

In the following passage, the word "*therefore*" is very illogically introduced. "Not so with man: born in a more helpless condition he would have fallen a prey to other animals, had he not been endowed with a superior faculty amply compensating for his inferior

strength. His powers of reasoning are greater or less, according to the number and correctness of his ideas. The new-born infant is *therefore* destitute of reason." *Therefore*, is for *that cause*; and he has assigned *no cause* for the infant's being destitute of reason. The word is then illogical here. *Accordingly* would not be liable to this objection: but *accordingly* and *therefore* are not exactly synonymous. "Nor have they *scarcely* any variation in their food;" it should be, "nor have they *almost*: *scarcely* is *not often*;" and how would, "*nor have they not often*" read? A few other little inaccuracies which we do not now recollect, struck us in the course of reading, but we are sure, from the author's own correct knowledge of grammar and style, if he has not already discovered them, he will immediately do so on a reperusal. One inaccuracy, however, just now occurs to us; and we the more readily remark it, because it has much crept into the writing of the present day, and is we conceive a gross vulgarism. "Wealth which before had *laid* in masses, was now beneficially diffused and greatly increased." It should be *lain* in masses. *Laid* is the participle of *lay*; and *lain* of *lie*. We know that *lay* is at present often used for *lie*; but this we repeat is a vulgarism, and ungrammatical. *To lay* is alway sactive; *to lie* neuter. *Money lays*,—save in a figurative expression where money is personified,—is therefore a solecism; for, what can money *lay*? *Money has* or *had laid* is only the past or plu-perfect of money *lays*, and is equally a solecism.

After having said what we have already, of the various merits of the work in point as well of justness of observation, correctness and extent of view, and profound reflection,—the highest merit such a work can have of elegance of language and beauty of style, it would be superfluous to repeat our opinion here. One point, however, on which we have not hitherto made any remark, is its selection of quotations. They show a great extent of reading, and an intimate acquaintance with the best authors, as well as prove that the reading has been not more extensive than well digested. The work is highly valuable, even on account of them alone; we cannot conclude without saying that it is well worthy the eye of the scholar, the reasoner and the statesman, particularly the latter, of whom it deserves to be the constant manual.—ED.